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Matching Contributions and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good:   
Experimental Evidence 
 
1.  Introduction 
  Laboratory experimental research on the provision of public goods has focused primarily 
on decision making in what is referred to as the voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM). In 
the most standard VCM decision setting, a group is comprised of a fixed number of individuals. 
Each individual is endowed with resources that can be allocated to either a private good that 
benefits only the individual (the private account) or to a pure public good that benefits all 
members of the group (the group account). The benefits are structured so that group earnings are 
maximized if all endowed resources are allocated to the group account. Each individual, however, 
has an incentive to free ride on the group-account allocations of other group members by 
allocating their resource endowment to the private account. 
  One topic addressed in the experimental public goods literature is institutional 
arrangements that reduce collective action problems by creating incentives that facilitate 
cooperation. The research reported here examines voluntary contributions to a public good in the 
presence of an external source of resources that are used for matching the contributions of group 
members. Two matching settings are examined. In the first, referred to as lump-sum matching, a 
publicly announced fixed level of resources from the external source flow to the group account 
only if the internal contributions of group members reach or exceed a pre-announced threshold 
level. In the second, referred to as one-to-one matching, each resource unit contributed to the 
group account is matched by the external source up to a publicly announced maximum level. 
Undertaking a controlled laboratory comparison of these alternative matching-fund settings is 
motivated by the observation that both arrangements are commonplace in fund drives for the 
provision of public goods in field settings (e.g. public radio fund drives).
1  The two settings with 
                                                 
1  See Shang and Croson (2006) for a discussion of field experiments specifically linked to on-air public 
radio fund drives, as well as a review of other related studies.   3
matching are contrasted with two control settings without matching where external funds are 
allocated to the group account regardless of internal contributions.  One control setting explicitly 
frames the unconditional contribution as a specific amount coming from an external source, and 
the alternative control setting simply adds, without explanation, the earnings generated by the 
external tokens to the payoff table for the group account when internal token allocations are zero. 
  These changes in experimental settings can be thought of in the following way. Assume a 
public good is to be partially funded through voluntary contributions. Further assume that the 
fund drive organizers have prior funding commitments that can be used for matching other 
potential donors’ contributions. From the perspective of agencies receiving contributions, the 
strategic question is what type of institution makes best use of the matching funds. As discussed 
below, in the standard VCM environment matching funds create incentives where equilibrium 
strategies exist that imply non-zero provision of the public good.  
The free-rider problem is particularly relevant for charitable giving, volunteerism, and 
other forms of philanthropy. While some of these activities can no doubt be rationalized as 
privately optimal, and in this respect no different from other economic activities, a significant 
amount of these activities entails personal sacrifices in order to improve social outcomes. This 
research is informative about the origin of such behaviors and their maintenance within social 
groups, since experiment participants experience similar incentives, albeit in a more abstract 
setting. By focusing on such a setting, the effect of economic incentives per se is investigated and 
comparisons are made that control for other factors that may affect behavior.  In this context, the 
research reported here studies the role of alternative philanthropic institutions for promoting 
charitable contributions and explores how such institutions affect individual incentives, behavior, 
and resulting group outcomes relative to a known socially optimal outcome that maximizes the 
group’s monetary earnings.   4
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarizes related literature.  Section 3 
provides details of the experimental design and procedures.  Section 4 presents experimental 
results, and conclusions are offered in Section 5. 
2.  Related Literature 
There is a substantial literature in experimental economics studying the linear VCM 
decision setting.  The stylized facts emerging from this type of experiment are that contributions 
to the group account exceed the standard economic prediction of zero tokens, but are below the 
socially optimal level of 100% percent contributions.  There is, however, considerable 
heterogeneity across individuals in their choice of contributions and across decision making 
settings where group size and the relative payoffs of the public good to the private good are 
varied. (See, for example, Ledyard [1995] and Isaac et al. [1994].)  
  Because outcomes in public goods settings have tended to be sub-optimal, researchers 
have investigated ways to foster cooperation through, for example, face-to-face communication, 
sanctions, and rewards. In addition, several scholars have investigated institutional changes that 
relate more directly to the research reported here. Eckel and Grossman (2003) examine charitable 
contributions in the context of a one shot, individual choice environment, referred to as a 
“modified” dictator game. Given endowments, subjects choose a contribution level to actual 
charities under alternative subsidies. Rebate and matching mechanisms are investigated that, 
under suitable parameterizations, are functionally equivalent. Holding monetary incentives 
constant, gross contributions are greater in the case of matching. One explanation for this 
phenomenon is purely framing; subjects may view the act of contributing with matching in a 
more favorable context than a rebate, leading to greater overall contributions.
2 More recently, 
Karlan and List (2006) report the results of a field experiment examining the impact of one-to-
one matching funds on contributions to a non-profit organization. Their design utilizes 1-to-1, 2-
                                                 
2  See Davis (2006) for further research related to the impact on charitable contributions of subsidies versus 
matching funds.   5
to-1, and 3-to-1 matching ratios. They conclude that matching increases both the probability of 
contributing and the magnitude of contributions, but variation in the matching ratio does not have 
a significant impact on contributions.  
List (2006) provides a review of additional field experiments  devoted to charitable 
giving.   One such study relevant to the research reported here is Landry et al. (2006). The authors 
conducted a door-to-door fundraising experiment with contributions to a public good solicited in 
four treatment conditions: a standard VCM setting, a VCM setting with seed money, and two 
lottery conditions where subjects purchased raffle tickets: one with a single fixed cash prize, the 
other with multiple fixed cash prizes.  Overall contributions to the public good ranked (from 
highest to lowest), multiple prize lottery, single prize lottery, VCM with seed money, VCM.  In 
addition, the investigation into potential framing effects of the control setting in this study is 
closely related to a strand of existing VCM literature relating to “leadership” contributions.  This 
literature examines the extent to which leadership contributions to the public good that occur 
early in the experiment can have a positive impact on the level of contributions; see for example, 
Rose-Ackerman (1986), List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), List and Rondeau (2003), Gachter and 
Renner (2004),  Andreoni (2006), and Potters et al. (2007) . 
   Finally, from the perspective of strategic behavior, the literature on provision-point 
public goods relates closely to the lump-sum matching setting investigated here.  See Marks and 
Croson (1998) for a review of this literature. The addition of a provision point to the VCM 
decision setting designates a publicly announced minimum level of resources that must be 
allocated to the public good in order for the public good to yield a positive return. If the provision 
point is not met, a refund condition is specified. Under a no-refund condition, if the provision 
point is not met any contributions to the public good are lost and yield no return to the 
contributors. In contrast, under a full-refund condition, contributions are returned when the 
provision point is not met. If the provision point is exceeded, a rebate policy must be specified for 
how such contributions will be used. The provision-point setting leads to multiple Nash   6
equilibria. While all individuals allocating zero resources to the group account remains a Nash 
equilibrium, the group income-maximizing Nash equilibrium is to meet the provision point 
exactly.  Nevertheless, exactly reaching the provision point can be achieved by multiple 
combinations of individual allocations.  This implies a distributional conflict across subjects, 
where some subjects may attempt to free ride on the allocations of others. 
3.  Experimental Design and Procedures 
3.A.  The Decision Settings 
This study incorporated four decision settings:  lump-sum matching, one-to-one 
matching, and two no-matching baselines. All decision settings utilized variations of the VCM 
framework of Isaac et al. (1994), henceforth referred to as the standard VCM setting.  Individuals 
made decisions in fixed groups of size N. At the start of each round, individual i was endowed 
with Zi tokens which were divided between a private account, earning a constant return of pi per 
token, and a group account, earning a return based upon the total number of tokens allocated by 
the group. Tokens could not be carried across rounds. For a given round, let mi represent 
individual i’s allocation of tokens to the group account and ∑mj represent the sum of tokens 
placed in the group account by all other individuals (j ≠ i). Each individual earned [G(mi 
+∑mj)]/N cents from the group account. Because each individual received a 1/N share of the total 
earnings from the group account, the group account was a pure public good.  At the end of each 
decision round, subjects were informed of their group’s allocation to the group account, as well as 
their earnings for that round. Subjects were not informed of the individual decisions of group 
members. 
The experiments were parameterized with subjects in groups of size N = 4 and individual 
endowments of 25 tokens per round. The return from each individual’s private account was one 
cent per token, and the group’s return from a token placed in the group account was G'(·) = 2.4 
cents.  Defining the marginal per-capita return from the group account (MPCR) as the ratio of   7
private monetary benefits to private monetary costs for moving one token from the private 
account to the group account yields MPCR = G'(·)/N = 0.60.  
Under the assumption that it is common knowledge that subjects maximize own-earnings 
and play a finitely repeated game with a commonly known end point, the sub-game perfect non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium in this standard VCM setting is for each subject to allocate zero 
tokens to the group account. As discussed below, however, the settings that incorporate matching 
funds have important consequences for equilibrium predictions. Finally, note that the payoff 
dominant Pareto optimum in the standard VCM setting, and for all decision settings investigated 
in this study, is for subjects to allocate all tokens to the group account.  
Lump-Sum Matching  
  In addition to the instructions for the standard VCM setting, subjects were informed that 
if total allocations to the group account met or exceeded 60 tokens, the group account would 
automatically have an additional 60 tokens added to it from an “external source” of tokens, with 
the earnings from these additional tokens being identical to those allocated by group members.
3   
Lump-sum matching creates a discontinuity in the payoffs associated with the group 
account at the point where the subjects meet the minimum threshold of 60 tokens. This property 
of the payoff function implies strategic elements to the game that lead to alternative Nash 
equilibria. In particular, similar to experiments with provision points, there are now multiple Nash 
equilibria.  While all individuals allocating zero tokens to the group account remains a Nash 
equilibrium, the group income-maximizing Nash equilibrium is to meet the lump-sum matching 
threshold exactly.  Thus, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is 15 tokens from each group member, 
but any other (asymmetric) combination of group-account allocations that exactly meet the lump-
sum match threshold is also a Nash equilibrium. From a non-cooperative perspective, subjects 
have an incentive to free ride on the allocations of others if they expect others to allocate 
                                                 
3 Subjects were explicitly informed that the external source was a computerized robot player, and loaded 
words such as “donor” or “contributor” were not used to describe the external source.  Similarly, tokens 
were “allocated” to the group account, rather than “donated” or “contributed”.   8
sufficient funds to the group account to meet the lump-sum matching threshold. On the other 
hand, from a game theoretic perspective, the symmetric Nash equilibrium of 15 tokens per group 
member may serve as a focal point for subjects (see Marks and Croson [1998]).  
It is important to note a key difference between this setting and the provision point setting 
discussed above. In the lump-sum setting, if allocations to the group account do not meet the 
minimum requirement of 60 tokens, those tokens are still utilized as group-account allocations 
and generate earnings for the group. In the provision-point environments studied to date, if group 
account allocations do not meet the provision point, those tokens are either refunded to the private 
account or lost, depending upon the particular setting under investigation.   
One-to-One Matching 
Subjects were informed that each token allocated to the group account, up to a group 
maximum of 60, automatically led to an additional token being added to the group account from 
an external source. The group account earnings generated by each additional external token was 
identical to those internally allocated by the four group members. 
The experiments with one-to-one matching create an increase in the marginal gain from 
allocations to the group account up to the maximum level of matching. Since the experiment is 
parameterized with an MPCR = 0.6, one-to-one matching implies an MPCR of 1.2 for group-
account allocations up to 60 tokens. This property of the payoff function implies the existence of 
multiple Nash equilibria. In particular, an allocation to the group account that is matched yields a 
marginal return to the group member above the $0.01 per-token opportunity cost. In this setting, 
all group members allocating zero tokens to the group account is no longer a Nash equilibrium. 
As with lump-sum matching, there are multiple Nash equilibria where group members’ total 
allocations to the group account exactly meet the maximum level of matching, and the symmetric 
equilibrium may serve as a focal point. From a non-cooperative perspective, subjects have an 
incentive to free ride if they expect others’ group-account allocations to be sufficient to extract 
the maximum level of matching funds.    9
Note that the earnings consequences of some allocations in the one-to-one setting differ 
substantially from those in the lump-sum setting. In particular, in both settings subjects face the 
problem of coordinating over whom will provide the group-account allocations to be matched. 
The penalty, however, for not meeting the full-match threshold in the lump-sum setting is larger 
than in the one-to-one setting. In the lump-sum setting, the penalty is $0.36 per individual, 
regardless of how close the total group allocation is to the threshold. In the one-to-one setting, the 
penalty per individual is $0.006 for each token the group falls short of the maximum level of 
matching. Thus, falling a few tokens short of the threshold in the lump-sum setting has a 
relatively large negative effect on earnings, while an identical group-account allocation in the 
one-to-one setting has a much smaller effect. Focusing on this difference in the group-account 
earnings functions leads to the conjecture that lump-sum matching will generate greater group-
account allocations than one-to-one matching.  On the other hand, if group members in the one-
to-one setting realize that matching results in the marginal private benefit of a token allocated to 
the group account exceeding the marginal private cost (MPCR = 1.2), an alternative conjecture is 
that the one-to-one setting will lead to a higher level of group-account allocations. Thus, standard 
theoretical considerations do not yield a clear prediction as to differences across the two settings 
in regard to the level of allocations to the group account.  
Because of payoff differences that can occur within groups, the analysis of experimental 
outcomes will also focus on within-group dispersion of allocations to the group account. Both the 
lump-sum setting and the one-to-one setting lead to multiple equilibria that can support within-
group dispersion in allocations to the group account, and subsequent subject payoffs. Given the 
severe penalty for not meeting the match in the lump-sum setting, however, the group allocation 
of 15 tokens per subjects may serve as a stronger focal point in this condition than in the one-to-
one setting. Based on this consideration, one might expect to observe smaller within-group 
dispersion of allocations to the group account in the lump-sum setting than the one-to-one setting. 
   10
No-Matching Baselines 
  In addition to the two settings with external matching funds, allocation decisions from 
control groups without matching funds were also obtained.  The earnings opportunities in these 
no-matching baseline settings paralleled those in the matching-fund settings, but without the 
strategic elements related to matching.  The first baseline setting can be interpreted as framing the 
external tokens in a manner similar to a “leadership” contribution.  All group members received a 
message that in each decision round an external source would allocate 60 tokens to the group 
account regardless of the group members’ internal allocations.  Thus, the minimum possible 
group earnings from the group account was 60 x $0.024 = $1.44. 
  A potential consequence of presenting the baseline setting in this frame is that subjects 
could be influenced by the external-source allocation to increase their own allocations to the 
group account.  To investigate whether framing the additional 60 tokens as coming from an 
external source may have affected group members’ allocation decisions, an alternative baseline 
setting was also implemented.  In the alternative baseline, group members were not given a 
message regarding the source of the external tokens; they simply observed an earnings table that 
associated $1.44 with zero tokens allocated to the group account, instead of $0.00 when zero 
tokens were allocated.  
The theoretical predictions for both baseline settings are identical to the standard VCM 
setting. Based purely on pecuniary gains, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is zero tokens 
allocated to the group account. Thus, standard theoretical considerations suggest that both the 
lump-sum setting and the one-to-one setting are expected to yield higher allocations to the group 
account than the baseline settings. Further, due to the existence of multiple equilibria, both the 
lump-sum setting and the one-to-one setting are expected to yield greater dispersion of within-
group allocations to the group account than the baseline settings. However, a large number of 
experiments examining the VCM setting report behavior that varies significantly from that 
predicted by standard theoretical considerations. Based on this evidence, it is an open question   11
whether the baseline settings will yield smaller allocations to the group account and smaller 
within-group dispersion relative to the two settings that incorporate matching funds. 
3.B.  Procedures 
[Table 1 here] 
[Figure 1 here] 
Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the key elements of each decision setting.  Each 
experimental session utilized twelve subjects who were randomly assigned to three four-person 
groups in each of three phases within a session.  Subjects participated in a sequence of ten (phase-
one) decision rounds in a particular setting, were then randomly reassigned to a new four-person 
group for ten (phase-two) decision rounds using a different setting, and were then randomly 
reassigned to another four-person group for the final ten (phase-three) decision rounds using a 
different setting.  Each phase corresponded to a specific decision setting (baseline, lump-sum 
matching, or one-to-one matching) and the order of experimental settings was systematically 
varied across sessions. Thus, data on nine four-person groups were collected in each 12-person 
experimental session:  three groups in each of the three phases, yielding three replications of a 
particular ordering of decision settings. 
The experiments were conducted using NovaNET software at the Interdisciplinary 
Experimental Laboratory at Indiana University-Bloomington during the 2004-2005 academic 
year.  Subjects were recruited from a database of volunteers.
4  After being seated at 
microcomputer workstations, subjects were given preliminary instructions that were projected on 
a large screen at the front of the room and read aloud by the experimenter.
5  Before beginning the 
first ten-round decision-making phase in the session, subjects were informed publicly that: 1) the 
experiment would consist of thirty decision rounds that were broken down into three ten-round 
                                                 
4 A representative from the lab visited various large introductory classes (psychology, geography, and 
economics) to ask students to enlist in the database if they were interested in participating in experiments.  
A wide variety of majors are represented in these large introductory classes.  
5 Instructions are available upon request.   12
sequences, 2) for each ten-round sequence they would be randomly reassigned to a four-person 
group, 3) earnings at the beginning of each ten-round sequence would be displayed on their 
computer screen as zero, but, 4) their final earnings would be the sum of earnings across all three 
ten-round sequences, plus a $5 payment for showing up.  Subjects then privately read through a 
set of computerized instructions describing the decision setting and familiarizing them with 
specific screen displays.  While subjects were privately reading the set of computerized 
instructions, an overhead was also presented with summary information related to the private and 
group accounts.  Finally, in the transition from one phase to the next, summary information 
regarding the subsequent decision setting was publicly projected on a large screen at the front of 
the lab and then read aloud by the experimenter. 
The experimental design called for two replications of each of the six unique permutation 
orders of the three decision settings, excluding the alternative baseline.  This led to twelve 
experimental sessions with 144 unique subjects.  To investigate the potential framing effect 
associated with an unconditional external allocation to the group account, the remaining subject-
motivation funds in our grant budget allowed two additional sessions utilizing the following 
ordering of decision settings: 1) alternate baseline, lump-sum matching, one-to-one matching, and 
2) alternate baseline, one-to-one matching, lump-sum matching.  Thus, the results reported below 
are drawn from a total of fourteen experimental sessions using 168 subjects to form 126 decision-
making groups.  Each group interacts over ten decision rounds resulting in a total of 1260 
observations at the group level and 5040 observations at the individual level. 
4.  Experimental Results 
Subject decisions are analyzed both graphically and econometrically at the group and 
individual level to examine the effects on allocations to the group account of changing the 
experimental setting.  The analysis focuses on three performance measures.  The first measure 
reported is the per-round token allocations to the group account by each four-person group, 
excluding any external matching allocations.  The second performance measure is the per-round   13
efficiency, where efficiency is defined as the percentage of maximum possible earnings extracted 
by the group.
6  The third performance measure is the per-round within-group dispersion of 
allocations to the group account.  Specifically, the standard deviation about the mean group-
member allocation is calculated.          
4.A.  Graphical Overview 
[Figure 2 here] 
[Figure 3 here] 
[Figure 4 here] 
Figures 2-4 display the mean value of each performance measure for each round pooled 
across experimental phases.  Several very general observations can be made from these figures. 
Observation 1: Mean allocations to the group account are highest in the lump-sum setting in all 
ten decision rounds, and lowest in the alternate baseline in eight of ten rounds. 
Observation 2: Mean efficiency averaged over all ten decision rounds is lowest in the lump-sum 
setting, but the rank ordering across treatments varies from round to round. 
Observation 3: Mean dispersion of group-account allocations within groups is lowest in the lump-
sum setting in all ten decision rounds. 
The lump-sum setting appears to be the most effective at generating allocations to the 
group account, as mean allocations in this setting are higher than all other settings for every 
round.  In most rounds, however, average efficiency is lower in the lump-sum setting because of 
the severe penalty (loss of 60 tokens) if the threshold for the match is not reached.
7  This penalty 
                                                 
6 The formula for calculating per-round efficiency is 
160 * 024 . 0
tokens) - (100 * 0.01  tokens) external     tokens ( * 024 . 0 + + , where “tokens” is defined as the aggregate internal 
token allocation to the group account and “external tokens” is defined as the tokens allocated to the group 
account by the external source. Because the external tokens are not provided by a subject within the 
experiment, the efficiency measure used in the analysis does not account for the value to the “external 
source” of unused tokens.  This measure of efficiency is highly positively correlated with the total tokens 
(group + external) allocated to the group account in a round (r = 0.9829). 
7 Groups in the lump-sum setting failed to reach the threshold necessary for matching funds in 18.3% of all 
rounds.     14
is not as severe in the one-to-one setting; and the full match was always present in both baseline 
settings.  The lump-sum setting also appears to diminish the end-game effect (i.e. decreasing 
allocations to the group account in Rounds 9 and 10) that is present in the other experimental 
settings.  However, dispersion of group-account allocations within groups increases in Rounds 9 
and 10 for all experimental settings. 
4.B.  Nonparametric Tests 
  This subsection presents two-tailed nonparametric tests to evaluate the validity of the 
above observations.  Potential treatment-sequencing effects are also examined.  The data to test 
Observation 1 are the mean per-round allocation of tokens to the group account for each group 
(one observation per four-person group).  Group means from all phases are included in each of 
the four samples (lump-sum, one-to-one, baseline, alternate-baseline), and these tests assume 
independence of group means within and across phases.  A Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the joint 
null hypothesis that the data from all four settings are drawn from identical populations (p = 
0.018).  To further examine differences between experimental settings, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
is used for each setting pair.  The null hypothesis of identical populations is rejected for the 
following pairs: lump-sum vs. baseline (p = 0.032, N=42, 36), lump-sum vs. one-to-one (p = 
0.024, N=42, 42), and lump-sum vs. alternate-baseline (p = 0.013, N=42, 6).  The other three 
pairs are not significantly different at the 10% significance level.  Thus, the nonparametric tests 
support the observation that group-account allocations are highest under lump-sum matching. 
  The above analysis is repeated to test Observation 2.  The data are the mean per-round 
efficiency for each group (one observation per group).  A Kruskal-Wallis test fails to reject the 
joint null hypothesis that the data from all four samples are drawn from identical populations (p = 
0.5098).  Further, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are not significant at the 10% level for any of the pair-
wise comparisons.  These nonparametric tests are thus not supportive of the Observation 2 
implication that efficiency is significantly lower, on average, under lump-sum matching relative   15
to the other treatments.  The insignificance of the rank-sum tests is not surprising, however, given 
the variation in efficiency rankings across rounds.   
  The data to test Observation 3 are the mean per-round within-group standard deviation of 
group-account allocations (one observation per group).  A Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the null 
hypothesis of the samples being drawn from identical populations at a 10% significance level (p = 
0.0973).  Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are also significant at the 10% level for both lump-sum vs. 
baseline (p = 0.052, N = 42, 36) and lump-sum vs. one-to-one (p = 0.034, N = 42, 42).  All other 
setting pairs are not significant at the 10% level.  These nonparametric tests offer marginal 
support for the observation that within-group allocation decisions tend to have lower dispersion 
under lump-sum matching.  
  The three-phase sequenced structure of the experiment may lead to differences in group-
account allocations due to the particular phase in which the setting occurred.  Therefore, in order 
to assess differences in group-account allocations between experimental settings, it is imperative 
to examine whether differences in allocations are related to the placement of a setting within a 
three-phase sequence.  To examine the significance of sequence effects, Kruskal-Wallis tests are 
used.  A test was completed for the baseline, lump-sum match, and one-to-one match setting.
8  
The samples are constructed by calculating the mean group-aggregate per-round allocations of 
tokens to the group account for each sequencing history.  For example, the seven samples used in 
the lump-sum matching test are: phase 1 (N = 12), phase 2 preceded by baseline (N = 6), phase 2 
preceded by one-to-one matching (N = 6), phase 2 preceded by the alternate baseline (N = 3), 
phase 3 preceded by phase 1 lump-sum matching and phase 2 one-to-one matching (N = 6), phase 
3 preceded by phase 1 one-to-one matching and phase 2 lump-sum matching (N = 6), and phase 3 
preceded by phase 1 alternate baseline and phase 2 one-to-one matching (N = 3).  The Kruskal-
Wallis tests for each setting were not significant at the 10% level.  Based on these nonparametric 
                                                 
8 The alternate baseline setting occurred only in phase 1 of the two experimental sessions in which it was 
used.   16
tests, it appears that the sequence of the experimental settings does not contribute to differences in 
group -account allocations. 
4.C. Regression Analysis  
  To further investigate the effect of decision settings, phases, and rounds on group-account 
allocations, an individual-specific fixed-effects regression model is estimated using all 5040 
individual-level allocations to the group account.  The individual-specific error components are 
estimated using the 30 decisions across all three phases for each of the 168 individual subjects. 
To account for lack of independence within a ten-round four-person group, clustered robust 
standard errors are utilized where the data are clustered by these 40 within-group decisions.
9  The 
regression equation is: 
. 10 ..., , 2 , 1 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 168 ..., , 2 , 1 , x , , , , , , = = = + ′ + = r p i u β y r p i r p i i r p i α             (1) 
The i,p,r subscripts index individuals, phases, and rounds, respectively.  The dependent variable, 
yi,p,r, is the allocation to the group account, αi is the individual-specific fixed-effect vector, and x 
is the data matrix of independent variables:  a lump-sum matching dummy variable (LUMP), a 
one-to-one matching dummy variable (1TO1), an alternative-baseline dummy variable 
(ALTBASE), two treatment-phase dummy variables (PHASE2 and PHASE3), and nine decision-
round dummy variables (RNDr, r=2, 3, … ,10).  The usual idiosyncratic residual error vector is 
ui,p,r . 
[Table 2 here] 
  Table 2 displays the coefficient point estimates, clustered robust standard errors, and two-
tailed significance tests of the coefficients.  In support of Observation 1, the table reveals that 
lump-sum matching generates a significant increase in tokens allocated to the group account 
relative to the original no-matching baseline; however, the smaller increase generated by one-to-
                                                 
9 For a detailed discussion of the heteroskedasticity-robust Huber/White sandwich estimator of variance in 
panel-data models see, for example, Cameron and Trivedi (2005, Chapter 21, Section 21.2.3).  The specific 
implementation utilized here is documented in Rogers (1993).   17
one matching is not significantly different from the original baseline.  As expected, the 
ALTBASE coefficient is negative; removing the “external source” frame from the baseline 
group-account earnings function tends to reduce group-account allocations.  This difference is 
significant.  Wald tests result in rejection of the following pair-wise null hypotheses:  LUMP = 
1TO1 (p = 0.000), LUMP = ALTBASE (p = 0.000), and 1TO1 = ALTBASE (p = 0.000).
10  Thus, 
allocations to the group account are significantly higher in the lump-sum setting than either the 
alternate baseline or the one-to-one setting.  Further, allocations in the one-to-one setting are 
significantly higher than the alternate baseline setting.  While the primary focus here is on the 
effects of altering the experimental decision setting, note that the treatment-phase dummies are 
not significant but there are significant differences across decision rounds.  In particular, relative 
to round 1, group-account allocations tend to be slightly higher on average in rounds 2-4 and 
there is a significant drop in group-account allocations in the final two rounds.  Referring back to 
Figure 2, this end-game drop in allocations is evident in all except the lump-sum setting. 
[Table 3 here] 
The conclusions from the individual fixed-effects model are also supported when the 
group-account allocations are analyzed at the group level.  Table 3 reports estimates from a 
random-effects regression model using all 1260 group-level observations where tokens allocated 
                                                 
10 Two additional models were also estimated .The results reported in Table 2 are robust to these alternative 
model specifications.  The first model is an individual-specific random-effects model using only phase-1 
data.  As in Table 2, cluster-robust standard errors are utilized with allocation decisions clustered by the 
forty within-group observations.  The random-effects estimator is necessary since all three experimental 
setting dummy variables are round invariant, removing the possibility of using the fixed-effects estimator.  
Estimation of the phase-1 random-effects model results in only one minor deviation from the results 
reported in Table 2: a Wald test for the null hypothesis 1TO1 = ALTBASE is significant at the 10% level 
(p = 0.0803).  The second model is a two-limit censored-normal (Tobit) regression model with group-level 
clustered standard errors.  This model makes strict distributional assumptions to account for the 
observations that occur at the fixed boundaries of group account allocations.  Approximately 31.3% of the 
observations on the dependent variable (1579 of 5040) occur at the fixed upper boundary of 25 tokens to 
the group account, and 10.3% of the observations (518 of 5040) occur at the lower boundary of zero.  The 
estimates of the Tobit regression are similar in sign and magnitude to the estimates reported in Table 2.  
The significance of the setting dummy variables and pair-wise Wald tests from the Tobit model result in 
two deviations from the fixed-effects model: ALTBASE is not significant at the 10% level, and the Wald 
test for 1TO1 = ALTBASE is significant at the 10% level (p = 0.056).   18
to the group account by a four-person group (the aggregate allocation excluding external tokens) 
is the dependent variable.
 11   The regression equation is:  
. 10 ..., , 2 , 1 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 42 ,..., 2 , 1 , x , , r p, g, , , = = = + + ′ + = r p g u β y g r p g r p g ε α             (2) 
The g,p,r subscripts index four-person groups, phases, and rounds, respectively.  The independent 
variables are identical to those described for equation 1 and reported in Table 2.  The usual 
idiosyncratic residual error vector is u,g,,p,r, and εg is a group-specific error component.  Cluster-
robust standard errors are utilized with observations clustered by experimental sessions (nine 
groups across the three phases) to account for possible lack of independence across groups within 
a session.  The results reported in Table 3 are very similar to those using the group-account 
allocations at the individual level that were reported in the fixed-effect model.  Specifically, 
lump-sum matching significantly increases group-account allocations relative to the baseline 
setting; however, allocations in the one-to-one setting are not significantly different from the 
baseline.  The alternate baseline significantly reduces allocations relative to the baseline.  Further, 
the following null hypotheses are rejected using Wald tests: LUMP = 1TO1 (p = 0.000), LUMP = 
ALTBASE (p = 0.000), 1TO1 = ALTBASE (p = 0.013).  Therefore, allocations at the group level 
are greatest in the lump-sum setting.  The one-to-one setting does not significantly increase 
allocations relative to the baseline, while allocations are lowest in the alternate baseline.
12 
[Table 4 here] 
  The efficiency and allocation-dispersion performance measures also require analysis at 
the group level.  First, efficiency is considered. The regression model described in equation (2) is 
repeated using a group’s per-round efficiency as the dependent variable.  Table 4 displays the 
regression coefficients, robust standard errors, and two-tailed significance tests for the 
coefficients.  In support of Observation 2, the table reveals that lump-sum matching results in a 
                                                 
11 Random effects are needed because the experimental settings variables are round invariant for groups. 
12 The significance of all Wald tests reported for the random-effects model in Table 3 is upheld when the 
model is estimated using only phase-1 data, which avoids the possible lack-of-independence complication 
for phase-2 and phase-3 groups within a three-phase experimental session.   19
small but significant (p = 0.007) decrease in efficiency compared to the baseline.  Average 
efficiencies in the other settings are also significantly decreased from the baseline.  Despite the 
differences in penalties from failing to reach the full match, a Wald test comparing the pair-wise 
null hypothesis of LUMP = 1TO1 is not rejected (p = 0.278).  One reason for the lack of 
significance between efficiencies in the lump-sum setting and the one-to-one setting is that there 
were substantially more full matches in the lump-sum setting compared to the one-to-one setting 
(81.7% of all rounds compared to 61.4% of all rounds, respectively).  Again, an end-game effect 
is present; efficiency decreases by an average of 3% in round 9 and 4% in round 10 when 
compared to round 1.  This result is consistent with Figure 3, which displays a decrease in 
efficiency for the final two rounds in all environments but lump-sum matching.
13   
[Table 5 here] 
The third performance measure to analyze is the dispersion of within-group allocations to 
the group account, where dispersion is calculated by the standard deviation about the mean 
individual allocation to the group account.  The regression model described in equation (2) is 
estimated using per-round standard deviation of group-member allocations as the dependent 
variable.  Table 5 displays the regression coefficients, robust standard errors, and 2-tailed 
significance tests for the coefficients.  In support of Observation 3, the table reveals that the 
lump-sum setting results in a significant (p = 0.019) decrease in dispersion compared to the 
baseline setting.  Wald tests reject the pair-wise null hypotheses of LUMP = 1TO1 (p = 0.000) 
and LUMP = ALTBASE (p = 0.078).  A Wald test comparing the remaining pair-wise null 
hypothesis (1TO1 = ALTBASE) is not significant at the 10% level.  Thus, dispersion in group 
                                                 
13  Two robustness checks for the random-effects model of efficiency were completed.  First, the random-
effects model was estimated using only phase-1 data.  Tests of the significance of the coefficient estimates 
were qualitatively similar to the results presented in Table 4 with one exception.  The null hypothesis of 
LUMP = BASELINE was not rejected at the 10% significance level.  Second, a two-limit censored-normal 
(Tobit) model employing clustered standard errors at the group level was also estimated to account for the 
observations at the boundaries of the decision space.  Thirty-one of 1260 observations are at the upper 
efficiency limit (1) and one observation is at the variable lower efficiency limit.  (The lower efficiency 
limits in the baseline and alternate baseline are larger than the lower limit in the matching environments.)  
All tests of significance were qualitatively similar to those shown in Table 4.   20
account allocations is significantly less in the lump-sum setting than either the one-to-one setting 
or the alternate baseline.  As can be seen in Figure 4, dispersion increases during the final three 
rounds in each setting.  This observation is supported by the regression results, as RND8 (p = 
0.055), RND9 (p = 0.000), and RND10 (p = 0.000) are all positive and significant.
14 
4.D.  Individual Allocations to the Group Account:  Benchmark Frequencies 
[Figure 5 here] 
 This subsection analyzes group-account allocations at the individual level organized 
around the frequency of occurrence of three benchmark allocations:  the individual maximum (25 
tokens), the symmetric Nash equilibrium (15 tokens), and complete free riding (0 tokens).
15  To 
avoid any possible impact on token allocations from an individual’s participation in multiple 
decision settings, only the phase-one data are examined.  Figure 5 displays relative frequencies of 
these benchmark allocations for each experimental decision setting, pooling across all ten 
decision rounds.
16 The percentage of occurrences of the maximum allocation is somewhat higher 
in the matching settings relative to the baseline settings.  Further, the lump-sum setting results in 
more allocations that are consistent with the symmetric Nash equilibrium compared to the one-to-
one setting, and complete free riding occurs less frequently under lump-sum matching relative to 
the other three settings.  
To formally examine the significance of these informal observations, negative binomial 
count-data regressions are performed where the dependent variable is the number of rounds that 
an individual submitted a specific benchmark allocation (an integer between 0 and 10).  The 
independent variables are the LUMP, 1TO1, and ALTBASE dummy variables described at the 
                                                 
14 Using only phase-1 data in the random-effects allocation-dispersion model results in the null hypothesis 
of 1TO1 = BASELINE being rejected at the 5% level (p = 0.019).  The other tests are qualitatively similar 
to the results reported above and in Table 5.   
15 Allocations near the symmetric Nash equilibrium (14 ≤ tokens ≤ 16) were also examined.  The results 
were very similar to those of the symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
16 Note that the symmetric Nash equilibrium only applies to lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching.  
The unique Nash equilibrium allocation to the group account is zero tokens for each baseline environment.   21
beginning of section 4.C.
17  Because each individual is part of a four-person group, an 
individual’s token allocations are likely to be influenced by the previous allocations of other 
group members.  To account for this within-group dependence, robust clustered standard errors 
are reported where observations are clustered by decision groups. 
[Table 6 here] 
[Table 7 here] 
[Table 8 here] 
The regression results for each benchmark allocation appear in Tables 6, 7, and 8.  A 
convenient way to interpret the regression coefficients in the negative binomial model is to 
examine incidence-rate ratios (IRR), where 
i e
β = IRR .  IRRs reveal the percentage change in the 
expected count of a benchmark allocation due to a change in the treatment condition, holding all 
other independent variables constant.  For example, in Table 6, the lump-sum setting increases 
the expected frequency for the maximum allocation by a multiple of 1.18 compared to the 
baseline setting, an 18% increase [i.e. 100*(IRR – 1)].  Overall, however, Table 6 shows the 
regression model is not significant when the maximum allocation count is used as the dependent 
variable (p = 0.251).  Table 7 shows that the coefficient for the LUMP dummy is positive and 
significant (p = 0.009); the IRR indicates a 79% increase over one-to-one matching in the 
expected number of rounds where the symmetric Nash equilibrium allocation is submitted.  
Finally, Table 8 shows that the coefficient for the LUMP dummy is negative and marginally 
significant (p = 0.064); the IRR indicates a 62% decrease in the number of complete free-riding 
rounds relative to the baseline level. Wald tests of null hypotheses LUMP = 1TO1 (p = 0.0112) 
and LUMP = ALTBASE (p = 0.0634) are significant.  The remaining pair-wise null hypothesis, 
1TO1 = ALTBASE, is not rejected at the 10% level.  Thus, significantly less free riding occurs in 
                                                 
17 A Poisson regression model was estimated first, but the results indicated that the assumption of 
equidispersion (equality of the mean and variance inherent in a Poisson process) must be rejected.  
Following Long (Chapter 8, 1997) and Cameron & Trivedi (Chapter 20, 2005) the negative binomial model 
was utilized to capture overdispersion in the dependent variable.   22
the lump-sum setting than either the one-to-one or the alternate baseline setting.  In summary, 
lump-sum matching appears to: 1) significantly increase the frequency of individual allocations 
consistent with the symmetric Nash equilibrium relative to one-to-one matching, and 2) 
significantly decrease the frequency of complete free-riding allocations relative to the other 
decision settings examined here. 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
  In the experimental literature on the voluntary provision of public goods, a wide range of 
studies examine alternative institutional arrangements intended to reduce collective action 
problems by creating incentives that facilitate cooperation. The research reported in this study 
adds to this literature by examining behavior in two fund-raising institutions found commonly in 
the field: lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching, where matching funds are provided by an 
“external” donor. 
The experimental results reveal higher “internal” (within-group) resource allocations to 
the public good under lump-sum matching. An explanation supporting this result is that missing 
the threshold required to provide the full match results in a larger earnings loss in the lump-sum 
setting when compared to the one-to-one setting.  Internal allocations in the lump-sum setting are 
also less dispersed, with more individual allocations at or near the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
prediction and fewer individual allocations consistent with complete free riding.  Neither the 
lump-sum nor the one-to-one setting provides strong support for play of the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium.  Finally, although lump-sum matching leads to greater internal allocations to the 
public good, there is not a significant difference in efficiency between the two matching-funds 
settings due to decision rounds where groups under lump-sum matching do not reach the 
threshold and thus receive no matching funds.  In the experimental settings investigated here, 
external matching funds that are not extracted by a four-person group are wasted rather than 
being carried over to future decision rounds.  In naturally-occurring field settings the validity of 
this rather harsh component of the experimental environment is doubtful.  To the extent that   23
unused matching funds are transferred to future endeavors that augment the provision of the 
public good, the efficiency comparisons reported here are of less relevance than the comparison 
of internal resource allocations to the public good.  
As a methodological issue, it is interesting to note the behavioral response to the framing 
change made between the baseline and alternate baseline settings. The alternate baseline removed 
any wording that alluded to allocations to the group account from an external source. Instead, the 
additional tokens were simply added to payoffs from the group account by adjusting the intercept 
term of the group account return function. With this framing change, lower allocations to the 
group account were observed in the alternate baseline.  Although based on a small sample size, 
this result is supportive of similar results that examine leadership contributions to a public good.   
  Fund-raising drives suggest several other interesting extensions to the experiments 
reported here. In particular, in field applications organizations often provide information on the 
current status of the fund drive with respect to donations.  Future research will examine this issue, 
using both lump-sum and one-to-one matching, by giving subjects intra-round information on the 
current aggregate allocation to the public good in conjunction with intra-round updating of 
individual allocation decisions.  An “increase-only” allocation rule can be applied to intra-round 
updates of individual decisions.  Larger group sizes, other group-account earnings structures, and 
the use of nonmonetary rewards will also be investigated.   24
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Table 1.  Characteristics of Decision Settings  
 






Individual Token Endowment  
Per-Round  25 25  25 
Decision Rounds  10  10  10 
Per-Token Return to  
Private Account  $0.01 $0.01  $0.01 
Individual Per-Token Return 
from Group Account  $0.006 
$0.006 for tokens 
other than the 
 60
th token 
$0.012 for tokens  
1-60, $0.006 for 
tokens 61 and above 
Total Individual Earnings:  
All Tokens to the  
Private Account            
$6.10 $2.50  $2.50 
Total Individual Earnings: 
Symmetric Nash Equilibrium of 
15 tokens            
NA $8.20  $8.20 
Total Individual Earnings:  
All Tokens to the  
Group Account            
$9.60 $9.60  $9.60 
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Ho: Coefficient = 0 
         t                     p-value 
CONSTANT 15.5658  0.5166  30.13  0 
LUMP 2.2728  0.4582  4.96  0 
1TO1 0.6258  0.4815  1.3 0.196 
ALTBASE -2.1035  0.8251  -2.55  0.012 
PHASE2 -0.6439  0.4529  -1.42  0.158 
PHASE3 -0.6575  0.4203  -1.56  0.12 
RND2 1.0119  0.2945  3.44 0.001 
RND3 0.6706  0.3523  1.9 0.059 
RND4 0.8512  0.3648  2.33 0.021 
RND5 0.3234  0.3870  0.84 0.405 
RND6 -0.0337  0.3882  -0.09 0.931 
RND7 0.0218  0.3846  0.06 0.955 
RND8 -0.1310  0.3747  -0.35 0.727 
RND9 -0.7044  0.3908  -1.8 0.074 
RND10 -1.2480  0.4464  -2.8  0.006 
Total Number of Observations = 5040 = 126 clusters of 40 observations 
Model: F(14,125) = 9.04, p = 0.000 
Fraction of variance due to fixed effect: 0.442 
 
 







Ho: Coefficient = 0 
         Z                     p-value 
CONSTANT 62.1570  1.9186  32.40  0.000 
LUMP 9.1312  1.3950  6.55 0.000 
1TO1 2.5431  1.6925  1.50  0.133 
ALTBASE -7.8864  4.1244  -1.91  0.056 
PHASE2 -2.4819  1.3498  -1.84  0.066 
PHASE3 -2.5605  1.6786  -1.53  0.127 
RND2 4.0476  1.0352  3.91 0.000 
RND3 2.6825  1.3671  1.96 0.05 
RND4 3.4048  1.4013  2.43 0.015 
RND5 1.2937  2.1349  0.61 0.545 
RND6 -0.1349  1.6227  -0.08 0.934 
RND7 0.0873  1.5262  0.06 0.954 
RND8 -0.5238  1.4321  -0.37 0.715 
RND9 -2.7381  1.5577  -1.76 0.079 
RND10 -4.9921  1.1084  -4.50 0.000 
Total Number of Observations = 1260 = 14 clusters of 90 observations 
Fraction of variance due to session-specific random effect: 0.565 
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Ho: Coefficient = 0  
        Z                   p-value 
CONSTANT 0.8771  0.0127  69.13  0.000 
LUMP -0.0351  0.0129  -2.72  0.007 
1TO1 -0.0224  0.0104  -2.15  0.032 
ALTBASE -0.0340  0.0160  -2.12  0.034 
PHASE2 -0.0170  0.0087  -1.96 0.050 
PHASE3 -0.0171  0.0157  -1.09 0.276 
RND2 0.0204  0.0077  2.66  0.008 
RND3 0.0074  0.0119  0.62  0.534 
RND4 0.0055  0.0096  0.57  0.567 
RND5 -0.0091  0.0177  -0.51  0.608 
RND6 -0.0134  0.0130  -1.03  0.303 
RND7 -0.0149  0.0119  -1.25  0.212 
RND8 -0.0141  0.0120  -1.17  0.242 
RND9 -0.0286  0.0148  -1.94  0.052 
RND10 -0.0396  0.0124  -3.20  0.001 
Total Number of Observations = 1260 = 14 clusters of 90 observations 





Table 5.  Random-Effects Model: Within-Group Standard Deviation of  








Ho: Coefficient = 0  
       Z                    p-value 
CONSTANT 7.5268  0.4048  18.59  0.000 
LUMP -1.0568  0.4517  -2.34  0.019 
1TO1 0.0677  0.4557  0.15  0.882 
ALTBASE 0.4012  0.8684  0.46  0.644 
PHASE2 -0.1001  0.3629  -0.28 0.783 
PHASE3 -0.1227  0.3140  -0.39 0.696 
RND2 -0.2424  0.1835  -1.32  0.187 
RND3 0.1594  0.2473  0.64  0.519 
RND4 0.0351  0.2892  0.12  0.903 
RND5 0.3553  0.2554  1.39  0.164 
RND6 0.4774  0.2734  1.75  0.081 
RND7 0.4384  0.2840  1.54  0.123 
RND8 0.5451  0.2846  1.92  0.055 
RND9 1.3791  0.2933  4.70  0.000 
RND10 1.6131  0.3266  4.94  0.000 
Total Number of Observations = 1260 = 14 clusters of 90 observations 
Fraction of variance due to session-specific random effect: 0.496 
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Ho: Coefficient = 0  
 Z                  p-value 
CONSTANT   1.0488  0.0908  11.56  0.000 
LUMP 1.1825 0.1676  0.1515  1.11  0.269 
1TO1 1.2482  0.2217  0.1487  1.49  0.136 
ALTBASE 0.9051  -0.0997  0.1790  -0.56 0.578 
Total Number of Observations = 168 = 42 clusters of 4 observations 
















Ho: Coefficient = 0  
 Z                  p-value 
CONSTANT   -0.2336  0.1693  -1.38  0.168 
LUMP 1.7895 0.5819  0.2227  2.61  0.009 
Total Number of Observations = 96 = 24 clusters of 4 observations 














Ho: Coefficient = 0  
   Z           p-value 
CONSTANT   -0.1335  0.2902  -0.46  0.645 
LUMP 0.3810 -0.9651  0.5205  -1.85  0.064 
1TO1 1.3333  0.2877  0.3758  0.77  0.444 
ALTBASE 1.1429  0.1335  0.4978  0.27 0.789 
Total Number of Observations = 168 = 42 clusters of 4 observations 
Model: χ2(3) = 6.54, p = 0.088 
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Figure 1.  Group-Account Earnings for the Decision Settings 
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